Things are escalating rapidly and accelerating after the seventh of October. The coalition is positioned on the shores of Palestine, and its eye extends beyond Gaza, defining its targets, especially the strategic headquarters in Qom. Targeting it has become a matter of time, starting with its arms. It has become evident that leaving space open in this way for the functional subservient system is prohibited, leading to this fragile accumulation of strategic weakness.
The dry reception of the lion in Saudi Arabia and the departure of many during his speech reflect everyone’s awareness of the fragility internally, regionally, and internationally. Protests in support of Gaza are everywhere except where the Assad system is present; all official stances were absent from “his authority,” except for the recycled chatter at the summit about the need for accountability for what is happening in Gaza, as if others are oblivious to his actions.
The Assad system finds itself exposed and forced to adopt a new type of coloring because hiding behind arms is over, especially the Sunni arm. Gaza is crying out, forced to leave the last openings of the soul, much to everyone’s regret. Hamas made a stunning choice, breached and humiliated the entity’s most valuable assets, making its loss unprecedented, believing that the magnitude of the entity’s loss would force it to sit at the table, obliged to call on the attackers and their backers for a significant bargaining market.
Surprisingly, the so-called “axis of resistance” signaled Israel’s readiness to accept this level of breach. However, Israel calculated that the return would be greater, with the primary goal of ending Hamas. This specifically surprised Hamas and its axis. Hamas had no response other than the operation that took place, and reactions to what Israel is doing now. Now, there is nothing but loud screams, and life has come to a halt; the hoped-for reverse Jewish migration has stopped, while millions in Gaza are forced to migrate. Israel has become inside the sector, and the international community is prepared and cannot intervene in any political or security project concerning Israel, except as Israel and America want.
On the subservient side, many red lines will be drawn on the one directly responsible for the functional arms. The Assad arm could have aligned functionally, but that was possible before 2011. With the Gaza event and after 13 years of offenses, the axis, especially the Assad regime, expected that the Gaza act would open the door for a negotiation ladder, aiming for a breakthrough, such as lifting or easing sanctions, or addressing the situation in Sweida, or a full legitimate return with financial flows. He tried in the Gulf and in China after the Russian sinking, but in vain.
The Assad regime believed that Hamas might open a mistake in this direction, but, like others, he was surprised by the violence used by Hamas and the Israelis’ ability to withstand and absorb it. Perhaps he now understands that the harvest will be in favor of Israel absolutely. Furthermore, perhaps he is starting to feel that the matter will extend from the arms to the head; the subservient system represented by Iran and the regime and Hezbollah and the Houthi are two heads and two arms. The arms in Yemen and Lebanon are entangled, but the heads in Damascus and Tehran are Machiavellian, using entanglement for the benefit of authority. After Gaza, a Sunni arm disappeared, lost in the intersections of the scene and its calculations; the margin for the bargaining game shrank, and the two heads were identified as directly responsible parties.
The Assad regime had no problem with the end of Hamas or Palestine if its situation were different; it is unstable and coexists with the Golan situation and daily Israeli shelling. Perhaps he thought he could invest in Hamas’s blood to open a negotiating track with Iran, the stronger party in the equation, considering himself benefiting, as if negotiations with Iran would benefit him. However, the picture has completely flipped, especially as he is fundamentally in a state of suffocation from sanctions, economic and political pressure, and criminal files that could be activated at any moment.
In short, the situation for the Assad regime is very confusing and disastrous. Neither the targeting of its soldiers by ISIS nor the breach incident in Saasa benefits it; it is simply not consumable, even if it extends its hand from under the table to propose an open peace, without any reciprocity with Israel. Hamas’s lesson has intensified awareness among Israelis. The Sunni “jihadist” game, invented by the Mullahs, is coming to an end, and the harvest awaited by Israel frightens the former subservient functional axis of “resistance and defiance.” As for Hezbollah, let’s just consider one statement from an Israeli official that “the northern front with Lebanon will not return as it was.” The situation in Gaza indicates that the spark may touch the barrel. It is clear that the consequences of the Gaza war are significant and will take their toll in many ways.
